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MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE DECREES BY VIRTUE OF
THE 1984 TAX AMENDMENTS RELATING TO
DEPENDENCY EXEMPTIONS
Roger M. Baron*
Effective January 1, 1985, section 152(e) of the Internal Revenue
Code' was amended to simplify the handling of dependency exemptions
for the children of divorced parents.2 Under the prior law, unless other-
wise specifically agreed to in writing by the parties or addressed by the
court decree, the noncustodial parent could claim a tax exemption if he
or she paid more than $1,200 yearly in support, and the custodial par-
ent did "not clearly establish that he provided more for the support of
such child during the calendar year than the parent not having cus-
tody."' Under the amended provisions, the custodial parent is always
entitled to the dependency exemption unless he or she signs a written
declaration disclaiming the child as a dependent for a given tax year.'
The written declaration must be attached to the noncustodial parent's
tax return. 5 The written assignments are to be made yearly or one writ-
ten instrument may cover a period of years or in perpetuity.6
The new provisions provide for the continued recognition of previ-
ous divorce decrees and separation agreements which specifically grant
a noncustodial spouse the deduction provided he or she pays at least
$600 yearly support.' Such a previous decree or agreement is described
under the statutory provisions as a "qualified pre-1985 instrument."8
* Mr. Baron is an Assistant Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law in Houston. He
received both his B.S. (1973) and J.D. (1976) degrees from the University of Missouri at Colum-
bia. The author wishes to thank Sandra L. DeGraw, Associate Professor of Law at South Texas
College of Law, Roxine Lawton, Charlotte Spandau, Glenda Taylor, and Sarah Baron for their
assistance.
I. 26 U.S.C. § 152(e) (Supp. 11 1984).
2. Taggart, Economic Consequences of Emotional Choices: Divorce and Separation Under
TRA 84, 15 CUM. L. Rav. 341, 358 (1984-85).
3. I.R.C. § 152(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) (1982), amended by I.R.C. § 152 (Supp. 11 1984).
4. I.R.C. § 152(e)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1984). There is also an exemption for children covered by
multiple support agreements under § 152(e)(3) (Supp. 11 1984), but this article will not address
this additional exemption.
5. I.R.C. § 152 (e)(2)(B) (Supp. 11 1984).
6. Taggart, supra note 2, at 359 n.83 and accompanying text.
7. I.R.C. § 152 (e)(4) (Supp. 11 1984).
8. I.R.C. § 152 (e)(4)(B) (Supp. II 1984) states:
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The objective of the new tax provisions is to remove from the In-
ternal Revenue Service the burden of resolving numerous factual dis-
putes between divorced parents over the issue of who actually provides
more support for the child. 9 Such disputes arose when, under the previ-
ous law, the noncustodial spouse paid more than $1,200 yearly as sup-
port. Under the amended provisions, the criterion to be followed by the
IRS is much more objective-the custodial parent always gets the ex-
emption unless he or she has assigned it to the noncustodial spouse
through a written declaration.
The effect of the new tax provisions is that noncustodial parents
who have been claiming a dependency exemption under the $1,200
yearly payment rule are no longer able to do so regardless of how
much child support they pay unless the custodial parent agrees in writ-
ing to permit the noncustodial parent to do so. Noncustodial parents
with a "qualified pre-1985 instrument" may continue to claim the ex-
emption. Undoubtedly, a large number of divorced noncustodial par-
ents who are affected by the new provisions do not have the benefit of a
"qualified pre-1985 instrument." There may well be more existing di-
vorce decrees than not in which the parties failed to provide specifically
for an award of the exemption in their agreement or in the court's de-
cree. A common reason not to have so provided was the existence of the
$1,200 yearly presumption delineated under the former law. The ra-
tionale would have been that the tax law had already provided for
guidelines in this area, thus removing a potential issue for divorce liti-
gants. Perhaps the best evidence of the magnitude of the numbers of
taxpayers dramatically affected by the 1984 change is that the. change
itself was designed to relieve the Internal Revenue Service from being
embroiled in extensive litigation between parents who contested the
For purposes of this paragraph, the term "qualified pre-1985 instrument" means any
decree of divorce or separate maintenance or written agreement (i) which is executed
before January 1, 1985, (ii) which on such date contains the provisions described in
subparagraph (A)(i), and (iii) which is not modified on or after such date in a modifica-
tion which expressly provides that this paragraph shall not apply to such decree or
agreement.
I.R.C. § 152(e)(4)(A) (Supp. 11 1984) provides that:
[A] child . . . shall be treated as having received over half his support during a calen-
dar year from the noncustodial parent if (i) a qualified pre-1985 instrument between
the parents applicable to the taxable year beginning in such calendar year provides that
the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to any deduction allowable under Section 151
for such child, and (ii) the noncustodial parent provides at least $600 for the support of
such child.
9. Randall, The Domestic Relations Tax Reform Act of 1983-New Rules, But Simple, 19
GONz. L. REV. 69, 79-80 (1983-84).
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$1,200 yearly presumption for the noncustodial parent.' 0 The effect of
the 1984 change has been to cause postdivorce disputes to bypass the
IRS and to channel the parties back to divorce court.
Consider, for example, the case of Davis v. Fair" in which a non-
custodial father, Fair, was paying $750 per month per child for two
children under a pre-1985 decree. There was no decree or separation
agreement which specifically awarded the father the exemption. Yet,
he was paying more than seven times the $1,200 yearly (or $100
monthly) milestone previously used in the Internal Revenue Code to
gauge the point at which the noncustodial parent would be presumed to
have contributed more support than the custodial parent. After the new
law went into effect, Fair went back to court to modify the divorce
decree to specifically provide him with the right to claim the children
as dependents or, alternatively, to reduce the amount of his child sup-
port payments.12 The trial court entered an order purporting to amend
the previous court decree to entitle Fair to continue to take the depen-
dency exemptions. 3 On appeal, the attempted amendment was re-
versed by the Eastland Court of Appeals, holding that Fair did not hold
a "qualified pre-1985 instrument" as of January 1, 1985, and his previ-
ous divorce decree could not be converted to a qualifying instrument
through a subsequent modification proceeding.' 4 Both the plain lan-
guage of the new statute' 5 and the legislative history of the 1984 tax
amendment' support the rationale of the Eastland Court of Appeals
10. The legislative history of the Deficit Reduction Act (P.L. 98-369) reported in H.R. Rep.
98-432, Part II, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984), reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
697, 1140 states:
Reasons for Change
The present rules governing the allocations of the dependency exemption are often
subjective and present difficult problems of proof and substantiation. The Internal Rev-
enue Service becomes involved in many disputes between parents who both claim the
dependency exemption based on providing support over the applicable thresholds. The
cost to the parties and the Government to resolve these disputes is relatively high and
the Government generally has little tax revenue at stake in the outcome. The committee
wishes to provide more certainty by allowing the custodial spouse the exemption unless
that spouse waives his or her right to claim the exemption. Thus, dependency disputes
between parents will be resolved without the involvement of the Internal Revenue
Service.
See also Taggart, supra note 2, at 358 n.79.
II. 707 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986).
12. Id. at 712.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 715-17.
15. I.R.C. § 152(e)(4)(B)(ii) (Supp. 11 1984) requires that the pre-1985 instrument contain
the necessary provisions "on such date"-"on such date" meaning January 1, 1985.
16. As is explained in the legislative history, the custodial parent is given the dependency
1985-861 685
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decision. The court recognized, however, that the new tax law as set
forth in the 1984 amendment might impose a "greater economic bur-
den" upon Fair 17 which required, in the interest of justice, that his case
be remanded for a determination of his request for a reduction of child
support.18
The Davis court held that "neither the trial court nor any court
can grant to Fair a deduction to which he is not entitled under the
Internal Revenue Code."19 This is consistent with the language of the
new statute and with prior Texas case law which discouraged the
awards of dependency exemptions by trial courts, this matter either
having been deemed to be governed by the agreement of the parties20
or preempted by the federal government.21 It is interesting to note that
Texas appears to have been the only jurisdiction under the old tax law
which discouraged awards of dependency exemptions by the trial court.
The vast majority of the reported opinions held that state trial courts
could make exemption awards.22 The new tax provisions make clear
that a "qualified pre-1985 instrument" must have specifically provided
for the allocation of the dependency exemption as of January 1, 1985,23
recognizing only subsequent modifications which may serve to remove a
pre-1985 instrument from the status of being qualified.24 In other
exemption subject to only three exceptions: (1) execution of a written declaration by the custodial
parent releasing the exemption to the noncustodial parent; (2) Multiple Support Agreements
where no one person contributes over 50% of the support (which generally do not apply in typical
divorce situations and also require written waivers by each person who contributes over 10% of the
support); and (3) "certain decrees or agreements which are executed before January 1, 1985
under which the custodial parent had agreed to release his or her claim to the dependency exemp-
tion." Davis, 707 S.W.2d at 716-17 (construing the legislative history of the 1984 amendment to §
152 as reported in H. R. Rep. No. 98-438, Part 11, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1985 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 697). The legislative history indicates that the parties may modify a
qualified pre-1985 decree or agreement so that it does not come under the recognized third excep-
tion; however, the legislative history clearly shows that the intent was for the decree or agreement
to have been executed before January 1, 1985. Id. The parties may not, through modification,
convert a non-qualified pre-1985 instrument into a "qualified pre-1985 instrument" as was at-
tempted by the trial court in Davis v. Fair.
17. 707 S.W.2d at 717.
18. Id. at 718.
19. Id. at 717.
20. Kolb v. Kolb, 479 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App. -Dallas 1972, no writ).
21. Ruiz v. Ruiz, 668 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1984, no writ).
22. Morphew v. Morphew, 419 N.E.2d 770 (Ind. App. 1981); Pettitt v. Pettitt, 261 So. 2d
687 (La. App. 1972); Westerhof v. Westerhof, 137 Mich. App. 94, 357 N.W.2d 820 (1984);
Greeler v. Greeler, 368 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. App. 1985); Niederkorn v. Niederkorn, 616 S.W.2d 529
(Mo. App. 1981).
23. The IRS has indicated that it will not honor the type of modification sought in Davis v.
Fair. Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 8609034 (Mar. 12, 1986). See also supra note 15.
24. I.R.C. § 152(e)(4)(B)(iii) (Supp. 11 1984).
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words, a noncustodial parent may lose his exemption under a "qualified
pre-1985 instrument" (if he or she had one) through modifications but
the noncustodial parent cannot gain an exemption by attempting to
convert an existing non-qualified instrument into a "qualified pre-1985
instrument" through modification.25
The greatest impact of Davis v. Fair is the recognition of grounds
for modification of a child support decree based solely on the greater
economic burden imposed on a noncustodial parent by the 1984 amend-
ment to section 152 of the Internal Revenue Code.26 The facts in Davis
v. Fair appear to represent an extreme situation with the noncustodial
parent actually paying more than seven times the previous standard
and then being denied the dependency exemption. Yet, once it is recog-
nized that a change in the tax code can in and of itself constitute
grounds for modification, where is the line to be drawn? Would Fair's
case have been remanded for consideration of his modification claim if
he paid only $350 per month per child, $200 per month per child, or
$105 per month per child?
A possible solution not addressed in Davis v. Fair is a recasting of
the requested relief by Fair in the trial court. In Davis v. Fair the trial
court attempted to "award" the exemption to Fair.17 Possibly Fair
could have successfully requested the trial court to modify the decree to
"order the custodial parent to execute an assignment of the exemption"
to him. Then the exemption would be available to him upon receipt of
the written assignment by the custodial parent under section
152(e)(2)(A). Such a method has been recognized by at least one other
commentator 28 and could also serve a reciprocal purpose in providing
an incentive for the payment of child support. The custodial parent
could condition the yearly execution of the waiver on the successful
payment of child support by the noncustodial parent for the previous
year. This suggested method would, however, impose the burden of en-
forcing the assignment decree on the noncustodial parent through a
contempt citation. Only the executed assignment and not the decree
itself would entitle the noncustodial parent to the exemption. 9 The
noncustodial parent might prefer simply to request a lower child sup-
port award based on the loss of the exemptions as suggested in Davis v.
25. See discussion in Davis v. Fair, 707 S.W.2d at 716; see also Sweeney, Highlights of the
New Tax Act, 70 A.B.A. J. 76, 79 (November 1984) and supra note 16.
26. See 707 S.W.2d at 717.
27. Id. at 712.




Fair instead of requesting an order requiring the custodial spouse to
make the necessary written assignments.
The 1984 amendments to the tax code dependency exemptions for
children and divorced parents simplify the task of the Internal Revenue
Service.30 They also impose an increased economic burden on a vast
number of noncustodial parents who were previously afforded the de-
pendency exemptions while simultaneously bestowing windfall exemp-
tions on the corresponding custodial parents. One result is an antici-
pated increase in actions to modify child support awards. Davis v. Fair
indicates that such a modification may be justifiable based solely on the
change in the tax law." No doubt future cases will give guidance as to
the extent to which modification is permissible and as to whether or not
courts will provide an alternative remedy by ordering custodial parents
to execute written assignments in lieu of lowering child support awards.
30. See supra note 9, at 75 and note 10.
31. 707 S.W.2d at 717-18.
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